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A participatory generation? The generational 
and social class bases of political activism in 
Turkey 
ABSTRACT  
 
This research aims to understand the extent to which generation and social class determine 
7XUNLVKUHVSRQGHQWV¶level of political activism. It tests macroeconomic socialization effect and 
social class effect on political activism as hypothesized by Ronald Inglehart and S. Martin Lipset 
respectively. It also strives to understand whether macropolitical period effect, suggested by P. 
Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, has also some generational implications for political activism. 
Further to these examinations, as an original contribution, it raises a generational challenge to 
/LSVHW¶VZRUNLQJFODVVDXWKRULWDULDQLVPWKHVLV±within the particular area of political activism± 
for those generations which came of age under authoritarian politico-juridical order and also for 
those which did not.  
 
Keywords: political activism, generation, social class 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Gezi Protests (GP) put Turkey in the limelight of political activism research. The GP, which 
took place in the summer of 2013, sparked as a resistance against the Turkish government¶s 
decision to reconstruct historical military barracks in the Taksim Gezi Park. In the beginning, a 
small number of environmentalists engaged in the protests, but the police¶s severe suppression 
of the first wave of protests through the use of tear gas and water cannons transformed the 
protests into a nationwide movement.  
 
The present research aims to investigate the role of generational and social class locations for 
understanding political activism and social change in Turkey. With this purpose in mind, it 
generates hypotheses derived from specific elements of ,QJOHKDUW¶VSRVW-materialist thesis, Beck 
DQG-HQQLQJV¶ WKHVLV linking political periods and political activism and /LSVHW¶Vworking class 
authoritarianism thesis. In addition to testing these hypotheses, it raises its original hypothesis by 
combining the two previous ones and suggest that the extent to which system-level 
authoritarianism experienced in the formative years determines the social class effect on political 
activism. This way it aims to H[SODLQ .DUO 0DQQKHLP¶V DUJXPHQW RQ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI
³JHQHUDWLRQDVORFDWLRQ´ LQWR³JHQHUDWLRQDVDFWXDOLW\´  
 
Turkey provides an unprecedented test case to investigate both inter-generational and inter-
class attitudinal differences. Young and dynamic population, developing economy, economic 
and social inequalities produced by the fierce application of the market economy model, 
inefficient redistribution policies, and intermittent political history are expected to produce 
large differences across generation and class categories. Another important factor underlying 
7XUNH\¶V VHOHFWLRQ LV, as preliminary analyses showed, LWV FLWL]HQV¶ low level of political 
activism, which is a dire news for Turkish democracy. However, it should be noted that, 
despite it takes the form of a case-study of Turkey, the models sketched in the analysis are 
generalizable for all societies experiencing similar conditions. Developing countries with high 
tempo of long-term socioeconomic development and unstable political histories would be 
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fruitful locations for replication studies testing generalizable conditions. Alternatively, the 
models that were sketched in this research can be applied cross-culturally within a comparative 
setting. Nonetheless, neither a research on other countries other than Turkey nor a comparative 
research were preferred since periodization of generations and interpreting the results 
adequately requires profound knowledge about the political history of the country that is being 
researched. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section extant literature on 
political participation is reviewed briefly. Following the literature review, data and 
methodology are introduced. Subsequently, the results of the analysis are presented. Finally, 
wider implications of the findings are further elaborated.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
By looking at declining levels of electoral turnout and party membership since 1970s, a group of 
scholars has warned that political participation was in decline in the industrialized countries of 
the West.1 This was a serious caveat because if that was the case, it could result in a crisis of 
democracy in the near future. However, another group of scholars has challenged this view and 
argued that, rather than declining, political activism was in fact on the rise when unconventional 
repertoires of political activism were taken into account. Ronald Inglehart was a strong supporter 
of the latter view. %DVLQJ KLV WKHRU\ RQ 0DVORZ¶V KLHUDUFK\ RI QHHGV WKHRU\ ,QJOHKDUW has 
described a shift from materialist to post-materialist needs in post-war Europe. According to 
,QJOHKDUW¶VSRVW-materialist theory, perhaps the most popular theorizing of the impact of secular 
changes in post-war Europe, individuals who were already born into physical and economic 
security environment in the post-war period did not need to struggle for their physical and 
material needs. Instead, enjoying these securities from birth, those individuals seek a higher set 
of needs, including need for self-esteem and self-actualization as well as intellectual and 
aesthetic needs. Eventually, by means of a generational replacement mechanism, those 
individuals with post-materialist needs were understood to have become the majority in the 
1970s, paving the way for a sociological transformation in Western European advanced 
industrial societies, which was labelled by Inglehart as ³WKH silent revolution´ Inglehart has 
argued that a post-materialist shift in needs had implications for the political activism sphere too. 
According to Inglehart, rising levels of physical and human capital undermined the conventional 
forms of political activism and introduced new avenues for participating in politics. More elite-
challenging, flexible, and direct forms of political action substituted conventional forms since the 
latter had substantially lost their ability to cater to the needs of a new post-materialist 
generation.2  
 
Looking at the Turkish FDVHIURP,QJOHKDUW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHwe can draw an analogy between the 
periods of economic development in the post-war Western Europe and in the post-1980 Turkey. 
Making such analogy is important because a participatory Turkish generation that was socialized 
during this period, if any, may breathe fresh life into Turkish democracy, as did the post-war 
youth in Western Europe. During the period ranged between 1980s and 2010s, which 
corresponds to the term in which most of the GP participants have spent their formative years, by 
the beginning of liberalization of the market, the Turkish economy grew by an average of about 
five percent and the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) quadrupled. The share of 
the middle class increased from 18 to 41 percent between 1993 and 2010. Turkey signed the 
Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995, which increased the Turkish export to the 
European region by about twenty times.3 By looking at this picture, we hypothesize in line with 
,QJOHKDUW¶V post-materialist theory that the members of the generation which have enjoyed 
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relatively affluent economic conditions of the post-1980 Turkey during their formative years are 
more likely to develop an activity-prone characteristic than the members of the preceding 
generations (Hypothesis I). 
 
Alternative to the idea of macroeconomic socialization enshrined in the post-materialist thesis 
and linking greater affluence at the time of socialization to increased political activism, 
particularly through unconventional channels amongst the new generations, another group of 
researchers has focussed on the role of macropolitical period factors to understand changes in the 
levels of political action. The period ranging from the late 1960s to the early 1970s in the US has 
particularly drawn their attention in this regard. Beck and Jennings, after investigating data from 
the 1965-1973 Socialization Panel Study and the 1956-1976 Michigan presidential election 
series, have concluded that the American youth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which they 
KDYH UHFRJQL]HGDV³DGHYLDQWSHULRG´ FRQVWLWXWHd a particular generation with respect to their 
level of political action. The youth of this ³WXUEXOHQW´ period, being influenced by some 
remarkable political events, including anti-Vietnam War protests, the Civil Rights Movement 
and the censorship of McCarthyism, developed a more activity-prone profile than their parental 
generation, their predecessor and successor filial generations. Rejecting the previous theories of 
political participation that were based on a curvilinear relationship between age and political 
activism, which had long served as a guideline to understand the patterns of American political 
activism, Beck and Jennings have concluded that there is no constant relationship between age 
and participation. Thus, to ³KDQGOHµGHYLDQFH¶DVZHOODVµQRUPDOLW\¶´LQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
the two, Beck and Jennings have DGYLVHG³DGGLQJDQH[SOLFLWSROLWLFDO IDFWRU WKHRSSRUWXQLties 
for involvement, into the participation equation´4  
 
As described in the above lines, when the development of macroeconomic condition is 
considered, post-1980 Turkey and post-war Western Europe show some similarities. However, 
they diverge significantly when macropolitical circumstances are taken into account. Unlike the 
situation in the post-war Western Europe in which socioeconomic development was 
accompanied by democratization movements and enhancement of civil rights and freedoms, in 
the post-1980 Turkey, macroeconomic development was accompanied by military and civil 
authoritarian governments aiming to re-establishing state authority and security environment at 
the expense of violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. Following the 1980 military coup, 
individual economic, social and political rights that were introduced in the 1962 constitution 
were largely suspended. The executive power was further strengthened. The council of ministers 
was authorized to pass a decree law.5 Executive authority over universities was consolidated. 
The Higher Education Council (YÖK) was established as a supreme authority over the higher 
education.6 Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was established to control radios and 
television channels.7 State security courts, the members of which were assigned by the executive 
authority, were effectively used to suppress political opposition.8 The anti-terror law was 
adopted in 1991, which occasionally made way for the violation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the civilians while fighting against the PKK terrorism especially in the Eastern rural 
zones. Departing from this point of view, in order to investigate to what extent macropolitical 
period effect has generational implications for political activism, a hypothesis, which is an 
alternative to the one that was derived from ,QJOHKDUW¶VSRVW-materialist thesis, is derived from 
BHFN DQG -HQQLQJV¶ WKHVLV ,W VKRXOG DOVR EH QRWHG WKDW ZKLOH developing this hypothesis, we 
made a distinction between three political periods in 20th century Turkish political history by 
looking at the administrative practices introduced by the incumbent governments and the legal 
system in power and labelled each of them either as authoritarian or non-authoritarian.9 This 
way we aimed to take ³RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRU LQYROYHPHQW´ into account as suggested by Beck and 
Jennings. Thus, we hypothesize that the members of the post-1980 generation are less likely to 
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develop an activity-prone characteristics than the members of the previous generation owing to 
their exposition to authoritarian system-level socialization during their formative years 
(Hypothesis II). 
 
So far, we have discussed only the direct generation-political activism relationship. However, 
it is likely that the generational effect on political activism is mediated by the social class, 
given the extremely large differences between the living conditions of social classes in Turkey. 
This thinking implies a potential indirect generational effect on political activism, which 
presumably operates via the social class structure. To understand this indirect effect, if any, we 
first need to understand the social class effect on political activism. With this purpose in mind, 
we will exploited /LSVHW¶V ZRUNLQJ FODVV DXWKRULWDULDQLVP WKHVLV The working class 
authoritarianism thesis is a well-respected theorising of the class-attitudes relationship in 
modern societies. In his seminal 1959 work, Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism, 
Lipset has raised perhaps one of the clearest arguments concerning the relationship between 
social class structure and authoritarian propensities. Lipset has argued that the working class 
was the most pro-democratic social segment of the society before 1914. The working class left-
wing parties were strong supporters of civil rights and freedoms, democracy and peace while 
the middle class ones resisted against the suffrage movements, promoted nationalistic policies 
and allied with traditional powers such as the church. However, since 1914 the working class 
had become the most authoritarian segment in many countries of the world. Lipset has noted 
that single-party system preference, political extremism, intolerance against minority groups, 
intransigence, punitive child-rearing patterns and low participation in politics are but some 
working class conditions which are largely underlined by factors including, low educational 
attainment, income insecurity, isolated group existence and lack of sophistication.10 Hereby, 
dHSDUWLQJIURP/LSVHW¶Vviewpoint on the relationship between social class and participation in 
politics, we hypothesize that the Turkish working class respondents are less likely to develop 
an activity-prone characteristic than their middle class counterparts and this can largely be 
explained by WKHIRUPHUJURXS¶V low education and income (Hypothesis III).  
 
Having clarified the relationship between the class structure and political activism, next we need to 
test this relationship across generations. We developed our fourth and final hypothesis, arguing that 
macropolitical effect has generational implications which determines the individual-level social 
class effect on political activism, to explain Karl 0DQQKHLP¶Vargument on the transformation 
of ³generation as location´ into ³generation as actuality´. Mannheim laid down the foundations 
of his theory of generations in his 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. His essay can be 
considered as a part of his sociology of knowledge studies. In this essay, reflecting his relationist 
perspective, Mannheim upheld Wilhelm 3LQGHU¶VYLHZVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHFRPELQHGHIIHFWVRI
constant and transient factors produce the historical progress. Thus, according to Mannheim, the 
knowledge about existence can only be achieved by considering spatial and temporal factors 
together. Within this context, Mannheim has argued that contemporaneity can not be the only 
factor playing a role in the formation of generations. Instead, it has to be accompanied by 
exposure to the same historical and social environment. Moreover, basing his theory on the 
theories of the development of the human mind, Mannheim has argued that this exposure takes 
place during the early phases of human life, because at this early period human beings are highly 
susceptible to the formative forces of life. Values that were acquired during this period occupy 
VXFKDQLPSRUWDQWSODFH LQRQH¶VYDOXHV\VWHPWKDW WKH\SOD\VLJQLILFDQW roles in shaping RQH¶V 
future attitudes and behaviour in a predicted way and this paves the way for the formation of 
generations. Mannheim has depicted the generation phenomenon as a combination of three 
imaginary concentric circles, generation as location (generationslagerung), generation as 
actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation unit (generationseinheiten). In this 
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representation, generation as location corresponds to the largest outmost circle which sets the 
widest criterion of a generation. The first inner-circle symbolizing generation as actuality 
surrounds the second inner-circle symbolizing generation unit. According to Mannheim moving 
from the outmost circle to the innermost one increases attitudinal homogeneity. However, 
Mannheim has argued that generation as location transforms into generation as actuality in some 
particular circumstances. According to Mannheim, social classes may blend in with one another 
as a result of being socialized by extraordinary time such as a war and this is what happened to 
German classes during the wars against Napoleon.11 Keeping in mind our two previously set 
hypothesis generated to investigate the generational implications of macropolitical period effect 
and social class effect on political activism (Hypotheses II and III) as well as 0DQQKHLP¶Vabove 
argument on the transformation of generation as location into generation as actuality a result of 
being exposed to major scale political events, we argue that /LSVHW¶V ZRUNLQJ FODVV
authoritarianism thesis cannot be applied to the generation which was socialized during the 
post-1980 period due to LWVPHPEHUV¶ exposure to system-level authoritarianism during the age 
they came of age. Instead, UDLVLQJDJHQHUDWLRQDOFKDOOHQJH WR/LSVHW¶V thesis, we hypothesize 
that for the members of the post-1980 generation, social classes were equalized with respect to 
their likelihood of participating in politics owing to system-level authoritarianism they have 
faced during their formative years (Hypothesis IV). 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
World Values Survey (WVS) data for Turkey were recruited for the analyses of this research. 
The survey is administered by the World Values Survey Association (WVSA), which is a 
global network of social scientists. The Turkish survey began in 1990 and continued through 
1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011. Five waves of the survey were conducted through face-to-face 
interviews with respondents aged 18 and over.12 The selection of the WVS is underlined by the 
fact that it is the only available data set for Turkey, involving all the variables of interest. Due to 
the lack of panel data, five waves of cross-sectional WVS data for Turkey, spanning over twenty 
years, accomplished our aim to treat the notorious age/period/cohort (APC) identification 
problem. After UHPRYLQJ FDVHV ZLWK ³QR DQVZHU´ DQG ³GRQ¶W NQRZ´ UHVSRQVHV for any of the 
variables of interest, a multistage representative sample of the Turkish population, consisting of 
6257 cases, is obtained. Construction of the dependent and the two key independent variables are 
presented below.13 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Our dependent variable is based on a survey item asking the respondents to self-report their 
participation in politics. The question reads as follows: ³Now here are some forms of political 
action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these 
things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it.´ Three forms of 
political action were given repeatedly to the respondents across all the five subsequent waves of 
the Turkish survey. They are: ³signing a petition´, ³joining in boycotts´, DQG³attending lawful 
demonstrations´. These three unconventional repertoires of action constitute the three dependent 
variables of the current investigation. While constructing the dependent variables, we dummy-
coded the answers. We assigned ³1´ for actual participation and ³0´ for non-participation. 
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Independent Variables  
 
Generation 
 
In order to analyse a potential generational divide in Turkish political activism, generation was 
employed as the first key independent variable. The generation variable was basically derived 
from the WVS question asking the UHVSRQGHQWV¶ ELUWK \HDUV 7KH following procedure was 
adopted while generating the variable. First, the 1960 and the 1980 military coups were 
pinpointed as two major politico-historical events in the 20th century Turkish political history. 
Next, referring to these two noticeable events, the Turkish 20th century political history was 
divided into three periods, which we labelled as ³IRXQGDWLRQ´ ³LQWHULP´ DQG ³SRVW-´
Having the three periods split apart, following Beck and Jennings¶ advice, opportunities for 
involvement was considered by making the following qualitative assessment.14 The interim 
period (which ranges between 1960 and 1980) was distinguished from the foundation and the 
post-1980 periods owing to relatively lower level of restrictive politico-juridical practices that 
took place during this period. Following this periodization, in order to clarify generational 
locations, each respondent was associated with one political period by referring to the year 
he/she spent his/her formative age in. Our selection of the formative age is guided by some 
important works in the extant early socialization literature. According to Mannheim the age 
seventeen or thereabouts is WKH IRUPDWLYH WLPH LQ D SHUVRQ¶s life cycle.15 Nie and his 
collaborators defined the formative period as an interval between mid to late adolescence.16 
According to Powell and Cowart, this period is between ages twelve and thirty.17 Erikson 
suggested the period from fourteen to fifteen for the formation of political views and attitudes.18 
Niemi and Hepburn proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as being crucial 
for the formation of participatory behaviour.19 Following this tradition, fifteen was taken as the 
socialization age. One particular age was preferred to a period in order to avoid overlapping 
generational locations. Finally, by looking at in which period one spent the fifteenth age, he/she 
is located in the related generation. The three adjacent generations were thus generated and 
named after the same names with the political periods.20  
 
Social Class 
 
Our social class measurement was derived from the :96TXHVWLRQDVNLQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶ current 
or last occupation. Following the question, respondents were given fifteen alternatives to match 
with their own occupational status. We collapsed 15-digit occupation measurement into a 5-digit 
social class variable following Erikson and *ROGKRUSH¶V class schema, which is a respected 
categorization of social classes in the capitalist economies.21 In addition to ³manual´, 
³nonmanual´ and ³service/self-employed´FODVVHV, we also included ³IDUPHU´DQG³XQHPSOR\HG´
categories due to the high number of respondents who identified themselves as ³IDUPHU´
³DJULFXOWXUDOZRUNHU´DQG³XQHPSOR\HG´ while responding the 15-digit survey question.   
 
Besides our variables of primary interest, a series of control variables were also included in the 
analysis. The configuration of this group of variables was guided by the empirical findings of the 
previous works. Since education and income variables are expected to intertwine with the social 
class variable, they were included in the analysis to isolate the pure class effect.22 The education 
variable was collapsed into three categories by looking at the three basic stages in the Turkish 
national education system: elementary, secondary, and university.23 The income variable was left 
in its 10-digit original model. Age was employed in its original linear format to control for the 
age effect. Age squared was included as a quadratic term to account for the curvilinear age 
effects. Survey year dummies were included to account for the period effect. Including age, age 
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squared and survey year variables allowed to deal to some extent with the age-period-cohort 
identification problem.24 Gender was included as a classical control variable. Three more 
variables, namely political interest, importance of politics and self-political positioning were 
LQFOXGHGWRFRQWUROIRUWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶JHQHUDOLQWHUHVWLQSROLWLFV 
 
Method 
 
A quantitative approach was employed in this research. Quantitative based methods enable social 
scientists to study common forms, trends and patterns of behaviours in a more rigorous way. 
Three groups of logistic regression were employed in the analyses for estimating probabilities for 
three unconventional repertoires of political action.25 The reason underlying the selection of 
logistic regression is the dichotomous character of the dependent variables. Each group of 
regressions consisted of four models. The first set of models tested the first and second 
hypotheses, the next two sets of models tested the third hypothesis and the fourth set of models 
ran three separate analyses with three samples coming from three adjacent generations to test the 
fourth hypothesis. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Before we move on with inferential statistics, we hereby represent descriptive findings first. 
7DEOHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHSHUFHQWDJHVKDUHVRI³KDYHGRQH´DQVZHUVJLYHQWRWKHSHWLWLRQER\FRWW
and demonstration questions for each generation divided by survey years.  
Table 1 about here 
The table provides prima facie evidence supporting our both first and the second hypotheses 
explaining generational implications of macropolitical effect and macroeconomic socialization 
effect in different rounds. As shown in the table, until 2007 for petition and boycott and until 
IRUGHPRQVWUDWLRQ WKHSHUFHQWDJHUDWHVRI³KDYHGRQH´DQVZHUVJHQHUDOO\VWDUWRIIIURPD
low level, reach a nadir in the middle and level off in the end. This lends support to our second 
hypothesis which is based on the macropolitical effect over the first one. However, by 2007 for 
petition and boycott and by 2001 for demonstration, percentage rates increase continuously 
which supports our first hypothesis which is based on macroeconomic socialization effect over 
the second one. Yet, in average, it seems that the macropolitical effect, in descriptive terms, 
prevails over the macroeconomic effect in the Turkish case. The descriptive findings reveal that 
the members of the interim generation seem to outparticipate the members of the foundation and 
the post-1980 generations when average rates are considered. However, it should be noted that 
the trend is changing in the recent rounds. For a more robust analysis, three groups of logistic 
regression are run for three unconventional repertoires of political action. 
Table 2 shows the models predicting signing a petition. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The first model tests the first two alternative hypotheses. After introducing all the necessary 
controls, the coefficient scores and odds rations pertaining to the categories of the generation 
variable show that there is no significant difference, neither between the post-1980 and the 
interim generations (p=.190) nor between the post-1980 and the foundation generations (p=.284) 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHLUPHPEHUV¶ likelihoods of signing a petition. When the reference category is 
switched to foundation, there is also no significant difference between the foundation and the 
interim generations (p=.550). The second and the third models test our third hypothesis which 
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was generated in line with /LSVHW¶s working class authoritarianism thesis. The second model 
reveals that the members of the nonmanual class are 1.79 times more likely to sign a petition 
than the members of the manual class (p<.000). However, as shown on the third model, when 
education and income variables are controlled, the significant difference between the two classes 
disappears (p=.803). The fourth model, on the other hand, tests Lipset¶s thesis across three 
subsequent generations. When the model is run with the data coming from the interim 
generation, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between the manual and 
nonmanual categories (p=.252). However, the members of the unemployed category have 
significantly lower odds of signing a petition than the members of all other classes. Apart from 
these, there are no statistically significant differences between any class pairs among the 
remaining four classes. When the same model is run with the data coming from the foundation 
and the post-1980 generations, no significant difference can be observed between any class pairs 
except for the difference between unemployed and farmer categories of the foundation 
generation.  
 
Table 3 shows the models predicting joining in a boycott.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The first model tests the first two alternative hypotheses. It is shown in the table that the post-
1980 generation, does not diffeUZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHLUPHPEHUV¶ likelihood of joining in a boycott 
from the foundation and interim generations (p=.292 and .247 respectively). The second model 
reveals that the members of the nonmanual class are 1.86 times more likely to join in a boycott 
than the members of the manual class (p< .000). Moreover, as shown on the third model, the 
significant difference between the classes fades away when the education and income variables 
are controlled (p=.306). The fourth model runs the same analysis for samples coming from the 
three subsequent generations. As the table shows no significant difference can be observed 
between the two classes of primary interest, neither in the foundation nor in the post-1980 
generations. However, the analysis of the interim generation surprisingly shows that the 
members of the manual class have 1.69 times the odds of joining in a boycott than the members 
of the nonmanual class (p=. 044). Yet, it should be noted that the difference is only marginally 
significant. In fact, our analysis shows that the manual class members of the interim generation 
have higher odds of joining in a boycott compared to their counterparts from all the other social 
classes except for the serv./self-employed class.  
 
Table 4 shows the models predicting lawful demonstrations.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The first model shows that the members of the post-1980 generation are significantly less likely 
to attend lawful demonstrations compared to the members of the interim generation (p=.007). It 
can be seen from the second model that the members of the nonmanual class have 1.79 times 
higher odds of attending a lawful demonstration than the members of the manual class (p< .017) 
and as shown by the third model the difference becomes insignificant when the education and 
income are controlled (p=.053). The fourth model reveals that the odds of attending in a lawful 
demonstration do not appear to be significantly different for any of the two classes in the 
foundation and the post-1980 generations. However, in the interim generation the members of 
the manual class seem to be more likely to attend lawful demonstrations compared to their 
unemployed, farmer and serv./self-employed counterparts (p=.027, .027, .037 respectively). 
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Nevertheless, the difference between the manual and the nonmanual classes is still insignificant 
(p=.190). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present research has aimed to investigate the generational and social class bases of political 
activism in Turkey. Our first and the second hypotheses basically suggested that the post-1980 
and interim generations are different from each other with respect to their likelihoods of 
participating in the three unconventional repertoires of political action. More specifically, we 
argued that if ,QJOHKDUW¶VPDFURHFRQRPLFVRFLDOL]DWLRQ WKHVLV LVDSSOLFDEOH WR WKH7XUNLVKFDVH
the post-1980 generation should be more activity-prone than the interim generation. 
Alternatively, we suggested that if Beck and Jennings¶ PDFURSROLWLFDO HIIHFW KDV generational 
implications for political activism in Turkey, the interim generation should be more activity-
prone than the post-1980 generation. Neither our first nor second hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between generation and political activism are confirmed for two out of three 
unconventional repertoires of political action. For demonstration only we achieved limited 
evidence favouring the Hypothesis II over the Hypothesis I. ,QRWKHUZRUGVQHLWKHU ,QJOHKDUW¶V
postmaterialist thesis is applicable to QRU %HFN DQG -HQQLQJV¶ macropolitical effect has 
generational implications for the Turkish case. This finding KDVDEHDULQJRQWKHFXUUHQW³ULVLQJ
participatoU\*H]LJHQHUDWLRQ´GLscussions. At least for what concerns our analyses, we do not 
find evidence for this pattern in our data. There might be several reasons underlying this. The 
first explanation coming to mind is that the macroeconomic and macropolitical effects might 
have counterbalanced each other in socializing potential generations. Our descriptive findings 
shown in the Table 1 supported this idea. An alternative explanation could be that, the Gezi 
generation is still too young to appear in our results. Each explanation requires further scrutiny 
and presents avenues for further research. Yet, eYHQ WKRXJK WKH (66 GDWD DVNLQJ UHVSRQGHQWV¶
participation in the last 12 months also reveal generational patterns similar to what we have 
found,26 if there were significant differences between the generations, there would not be any 
way of knowing with data in hand, except making predictions in accordance with theories, 
whether socialization mechanism or period effect was primarily responsible of this difference, 
owing to the fact that the WVS question does not reveal the exact date that the activity took 
place. 
 
Our third hypothesis was designed DVDWHVWRI/LSVHW¶s working class authoritarianism thesis. We 
K\SRWKHVL]HGLQOLQHZLWK/LSVHW¶VWKHVLVWKDWthe members of the working class are less likely to 
participate in politics than the members of the middle class and this is largely due to the former 
JURXS¶V low education and to a lesser extent low income. The analysis run with the pooled data 
coming from all the generations validated /LSVHW¶VWKHVLVWRDODUJHH[WHQW,WZDVVKRZQWKDWfor 
participating in all the three unconventional repertoires of political action, the members of the 
nonmanual class outstripped the members of the manual class and the differences between the 
two classes disappeared when the education and income variables were controlled. However, the 
whole picture changed when the generation factor was taken into account. Our fourth group of 
analysis showed that although it does not play a direct one, generation plays an indirect role in 
political activism operating via social class structure. We found that for all the three 
unconventional repertoires of action, the total number of significant differences in the interim 
generation (which is ten) is higher than the total number of significant differences in the 
foundation (which is one) and post-1980 (which is zero) generations.27 This finding supports our 
fourth hypothesis suggesting that for those generations, which have come of age under an 
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authoritarian politico-juridical order, the social classes are equalized with respect to their 
PHPEHUV¶OHYHORISROLWLFDODFWLYLW\<HWthe most interesting is the finding related to the analysis 
of the interim generation, for which we expected Lipset¶VWKHVLVto hold true GXHWRLWVPHPEHUV¶
non-exposure to system-level authoritarianism. Surprisingly, our finding run explicitly counter to 
/LSVHW¶VSUHGLFWLRQ. We found that, in the interim generation the manual class is not less activity-
prone than the nonmanual class. %\ORRNLQJDWWKLVSLFWXUHZHFDQFRQFOXGHWKDW/LSVHW¶VWKHVLV
is not invalid only for those generations which were socialized by system-level authoritarianism 
but also for those which were not. Moreover, for all the three forms of action in the interim 
generation, the total number of inter-class differences between the manual class and the two low 
classes (which is four) was greater than the total number of inter-class differences between the 
manual class and the two high classes (which is two). In other words, the manual class resembles 
to the two high classes with a greater degree than it resembles to the two low classes. By looking 
at this extra finding, we can conclude that for those generations, which were not exposed to 
system-level authoritarianism during their formative years, the main clash regarding political 
activism seems to be between the traditional and modern classes. This suggests a role for 
modernization effect. 7KLV ILQGLQJ DOVR SURPRWHV PRGHUQL]DWLRQ WKHRU\¶V FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI WKH
VRFLDOFODVVHVWKDWZDVEDVHGRQWUDGLWLRQDOPRGHUQGLFKRWRP\DJDLQVW/LSVHW¶VFDWHJRUL]DWLRQRI
the classes which regards manual/working class among the low classes. 
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